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 Abstract 
 A growth in the number of hate groups that operate in the United States over the 
past decade counters many researchers‟ claims that overt prejudice and discrimination no 
longer have influence. In this thesis, we explore how people react with moral outrage and 
moral cleansing toward hate groups‟ moral transgressions of racial egalitarianism—a 
strong sacred value among those who desire group-based equality. Across two 
experiments, we find that people perceive hate groups as immoral social agents, and 
people express moral outrage against them. We also find that people who were morally 
contaminated by hate groups (i.e., by being led to believe that they share compatible 
ideological beliefs with hate groups) perceived more racism in their environments than 
people who are not morally contaminated by hate groups. We discuss implications for 
confronting prejudice, theoretical debates on moral licensing and moral cleansing, and 
engaging in progressive action to improve intergroup relations. 
Keywords: Racism, Morality, Hate Groups, Discrimination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................ iii 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 
Perceiving Subtle Racism................................................................................................ 3 
Hate Groups in the United States .................................................................................... 4 
Morality-Based Reactions to Hate Groups...................................................................... 7 
The Present Research .................................................................................................... 11 
Pilot Study ......................................................................................................................... 12 
Method .......................................................................................................................... 13 
Results and Discussion .................................................................................................. 13 
Experiment1 ...................................................................................................................... 15 
Method .......................................................................................................................... 16 
Results ........................................................................................................................... 17 
Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 20 
Experiment 2 ..................................................................................................................... 21 
Method .......................................................................................................................... 21 
Results ........................................................................................................................... 24 
Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 27 
General Discussion ........................................................................................................... 28 
Overkill or Compensation ............................................................................................. 29 
After Perceiving Racism ............................................................................................... 31 
Spatial Moral Contamination ........................................................................................ 32 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 33 
References ......................................................................................................................... 35 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1: List of Groups from Pilot Study ......................................................................... 39 
Table 2: Correlations from Experiment 1 ......................................................................... 46 
Table 3: Mean Perceptions of Racism from Experiment 2 ............................................... 47 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Ratings of Immorality from Experiment 1 ........................................................ 48 
Figure 2: Moral Outrage from Experiment 1 .................................................................... 49 
Figure 3: Perceptions of Racism from Experiment 2........................................................ 50 
 
List of Appendices 
Appendix A: Arguments against Immigration from Experiment 1 .................................. 51 
Appendix B: Arguments against Affirmative Action from Experiment 2 ........................ 52 
Appendix C: Results from Pilot Study.............................................................................. 53 
Appendix D: Adapted Symbolic Racism Scale ................................................................ 61 
 
 
 
 
v
Running head: MORALLY CONTAMINATING HATE GROUPS 1 
The Morally Contaminating (and Motivating) Influence of Hate Groups in the U.S. 
Hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan may seem to be a vestige of a racist past, 
but the number of hate groups in the U.S. has increased by over 50% since 2000 (Potok, 
2009). Despite their growing popularity, we predict that many people view these groups 
as a threat to society's moral integrity, so exposure to hate groups may cause people to 
react with moral outrage (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997) and engage in seemingly redundant 
moral cleansing processes (i.e., moral overkill; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Lerner, & Green, 
2000). However, there are theoretical reasons to believe that merely expressing outrage 
toward hate groups is not sufficient for motivating action or vigilance against them 
because in expressing outrage, people earn a moral license as nonracist and no longer 
need to show that they are nonracist (e.g., Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; Monin & 
Miller, 2001). Even though overt forms of prejudice and racism are taboo and discredited 
in contemporary society, they continue to flourish in some circles, and may produce 
unintended tolerance of racism even among those who disapprove of them. It may 
therefore be important to understand how people can remain vigilant to prejudice even if 
they reject its overt expressions.  
An unsettled question is whether morality-based reactions toward hate groups will 
lead to vigilance against racism. Different theories make conflicting predictions. The 
sacred value protection model (Tetlock et al., 2000) suggests that racial equality may be a 
sacred value (i.e., a value not subject to qualification or equivocation) among those who 
value racial egalitarianism. Whenever sacred values are violated (e.g., by hate groups), 
people may feel morally contaminated and may react toward the violator (e.g., a hate 
group) with moral outrage, and seek to morally cleanse themselves by seeking 
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opportunities to rid themselves of the contamination. According to the moral credentials 
model, rejecting hate groups could socially license people as non-racist, so they may not 
need to perceive racism in their environments to demonstrate their non-racism (Monin & 
Miller, 2001). According to the overkill hypothesis in the sacred value protection model, 
however, exposure to hate groups may make people overreact with several redundant 
moral defense strategies (i.e., even more moral outrage and moral cleansing), which 
would make them perceive racism in their environments (Tetlock et al., 2000). Thus, it 
remains unclear whether expressing the view that hate groups are immoral will make one 
sensitive to prejudice or not. The present thesis tests whether hate groups have power and 
influence to increase tolerance of racism even though people may reject them as immoral 
social agents. We also test whether making people aware of this hateful contamination in 
their lives may increase the likelihood that they recognize prejudice and protest against it. 
In the present research, we explore people‟s perceptions of and reactions toward 
hate groups in the United States at present. We begin with an analysis of the current state 
of hate groups in the U.S. along with an examination of the hate groups‟ belief systems 
and ideologies. We suggest that hate groups, who are mostly white supremacist groups, 
provide an ideological contrast to racial egalitarianism and thus by definition violate the 
principle of racial egalitarianism. We then explore morality-based reactions people may 
experience after exposure to hate groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. When people who 
value egalitarian group relations feel as though they share similar beliefs and opinions as 
a hate group, they can be morally contaminated and thus motivated to morally cleanse 
themselves. We then propose two experiments to explore how people perceive and react 
to hate groups. 
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Perceiving Subtle Racism 
Prejudice and discrimination cannot be separated from their social, cultural, and 
historical contexts. From the times of the pre-Civil Rights era in the 1950s and 1960s to 
contemporary society, psychologists have claimed that the nature of prejudice has 
changed (see Duckitt, 1992). In this “new” era of racial politics, psychologists have 
suggested that prejudice operates from at least two levels (i.e., the explicit and implicit; 
Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997), and the “new” form of 
prejudice is subtle and covert (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997). 
Some research, for example, has shown that people are not even aware of some 
stereotypes that have existed for centuries (e.g., Negro-Ape metaphor; Goff, Eberhardt, 
Williams, & Jackson, 2008). These findings suggest that people may be detached from 
the issues of race and racism in U.S. society, and this detachment may be explained by 
the subtle and covert form of racism. The end of de jure racial discrimination makes it 
difficult for people to literally see how people and institutions continue to discriminate 
against people of color in the United States because there are very few physical, visual 
symbols of institutionalized or individual racism (e.g., “Whites Only” signs). People may 
therefore be less vigilant to racism because perceiving subtle racism is difficult. 
The end of overt and legal racial discrimination can make it difficult for people to 
label acts of racism that might find their way into political discourse. Thus, when 
attempting to understand arguments in debates of public policy (e.g., affirmative action, 
immigration, and so on), people may be unaware of or unsure of the racist content in 
political discourse. Although there may be principled reasons for arguing against policies 
aimed at achieving racial equality (e.g., affirmative action and principled conservatism; 
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Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, & Kendrick, 1991), these types of political discourse 
typically have racist and group dominance-related undercurrents (Federico & Sidanius, 
2002; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996). The arguments and messages that hate groups 
promote can find their way into political discourse, and people may be unaware of the 
source of these arguments. Ultimately, these arguments are based in racism. It may be 
important to understand how people increase their vigilance against subtle and covert 
forms of prejudice and racism by elucidating the racist sources of the political discourse 
surrounding various public policies. 
Hate Groups in the United States 
Even though contemporary research on prejudice stresses the covert nature of 
racism (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997), overt forms of 
racism and prejudice still exist in contemporary society (Leach, 2005; Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999). Hate groups, for example, may represent the last stand of the formal, overt 
prejudice and discrimination that people believe have been eliminated since the U.S. 
Civil Rights Movement. Hate groups are hierarchy-enhancing social agents (see Sidanius 
& Pratto, 1999, p. 38) because their presence in the U.S. and around the world contributes 
to group-based social hierarchy and increased prejudice and discrimination. Thus, 
understanding how these prejudiced social groups can increase prejudice in society even 
in a society that is intolerant of overt racism may be important in understanding how even 
overt forms of prejudice can still successfully operate in contemporary society. 
 Hate groups are organizations whose “beliefs and practices...attack or malign an 
entire class of people, typically for their immutable characteristics” (Southern Poverty 
Law Center, 2010). Hate groups‟ mission statements overtly identify social groups they 
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find to be problematic and blatantly advocate discrimination against those social groups 
(e.g., deportation, isolation, or extermination). Hate groups can also be identified by 
exploring various ideological patterns that are common to all hate groups (i.e., 
conspiracism, dualism, and apocalypticism; Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). In 2000, 602 hate 
groups were active in the U.S., and in 2009, 932 hate groups were active in the U.S. 
(Potok, 2010)—an average growth of more than 30 hate groups per year. Compiling 
population data from the 2010 U.S. Census and from the Southern Poverty Law Center‟s 
(SPLC) count of the number of hate groups in the U.S., there are on average four hate 
groups for every one million people in the United States. The SPLC—an anti-hate group 
organization—suggests that the recent trend in hate groups is a growth in anti-
government militia groups (Potok, 2010). Other more historical hate groups currently 
operate in the U.S. including the Ku Klux Klan, National Socialist Workers Party (Nazi 
Party), and Skinheads. 
Hate groups share an ideological pattern that emphasizes conspiracism, dualism, 
and apocalypticism (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). Conspiracism is the belief that major 
historical events are caused by some conspiracy of elite groups in society trying to 
maintain their control of all citizens. Hate groups believe that all people are dichotomized 
into “good” and “evil,” and their group‟s members are good while everyone else is evil 
(i.e., dualism). Finally, members of hate groups believe that an imminent war between 
groups will force hate group members to fight against those they hate, so they are 
preparing for the war by recruiting members and disseminating propaganda (i.e., 
apocalypticism; Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). These three components of hate groups‟ 
ideologies oppose hierarchy-attenuating ideologies of egalitarianism and universalism. 
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 Hate groups can be separated into three very broad categories, which are not 
always distinct from one another. Political hate groups generally derive their ideologies 
from Nazi and neo-Nazi doctrine, and their group‟s organizational structure reflects their 
authoritarian and hierarchical ideology (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). These political hate 
groups believe in the inherent superiority of the White race over all others and believe 
that all other races should be either removed from existence or deported from the country 
in order to protect white culture. These groups are nationalist and invest in the promotion 
of a purely white society, so they promote ingroup favoritism, reject interracial 
interactions (e.g., immigration and especially miscegenation; Glaser, Dixit, & Green, 
2002), and decry perceived attempts at disadvantaging the white race (e.g., affirmative 
action).  
 Religious hate groups, on the other hand, derive their ideologies from religious 
doctrine and orthodoxy, and they use religion to legitimize their hateful, discriminatory 
stance against outgroup members (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). Some examples of these 
groups include Christian Identity, Creativity Movement, and the White Order of Thule. 
The Christian Identity Movement, for example, believes that white European people from 
Great Britain and Germany are God‟s chosen people, and they also believe that Jewish 
people are the descendants of Satan and Eve from the Garden of Eden (Berlet & 
Vysotsky, 2006). Christian Identity followers also believe that Jews install blacks and 
other people of color in positions of power in order to prepare for the race war that will 
come as prophesized in the book of Revelations in the Christian Bible (Berlet & 
Vysotsky, 2006).  
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The third broad category is the youth cultural sector, which is a relatively 
informal type of hate group (Berlet & Vysotsky, 2006). These groups include Skinheads, 
Black Metal (a hateful musical propaganda group), and other informal hate movements. 
The Skinheads represent a countercultural, youth movement, which has its origins in 
punk rock from England. Skinheads attend parties and rallies and attack outgroup 
members without notice or pre-planning (Schafer & Navarro, 2003). These various types 
of hate groups represent a social movement in the U.S. that seeks to eradicate outgroup 
members and promote an ingroup identity that derives its self-perceived “legitimacy” 
from hierarchy-enhancing ideologies that promote prejudice and discrimination. The 
ideologies that hate groups follow contradict and violate racial egalitarianism, which is a 
sacred value held by many people in the United States.  
Morality-Based Reactions to Hate Groups  
 Some values that people hold cannot be violated under any circumstances (e.g., 
assessing the monetary worth of human life; Fiske & Tetlock, 1997) whereas other values 
can be acceptable under certain circumstances (e.g., lying). When people‟s sacred values 
are threatened (e.g., hate groups threaten racial egalitarianism), they can become intuitive 
moralists-theologians, who engage in a struggle to be morally clean and avoid morally 
contaminating thoughts or behaviors. People who experience actual or perceived moral 
contamination engage in moral outrage and moral cleansing (Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, 
Lerner, & Green, 2000).  
For a variety of reasons including the U.S.‟s history of race relations, racial 
equality has become a sacred value that should not be violated under any circumstances. 
It can be taboo for some people to blatantly advocate racial inequality (Monin & Miller, 
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2001; Plant & Devine, 2009). For example, people who are asked to set prices for 
insurance policies in different communities express moral outrage and moral cleansing 
when they discover that the insurance prices would differentially affect black and white 
customers (Tetlock et al., 2000). The sacred value protection model (Tetlock et al., 2000) 
provides a theoretical basis for understanding how people may react to violators of racial 
equality with moral outrage and moral cleansing among people who value group-based 
equality. Because the vast majority of hate groups blatantly attempt to disadvantage racial 
minorities, they may be perceived as immoral social agents by people who value group-
based equality, and those people may express moral outrage against them. 
 Racist hate groups (e.g., the Ku Klux Klan and Skinheads) by definition violate 
racial egalitarianism, so people who desire and value group-based equality may react 
toward these groups with moral outrage and moral cleansing.  Moral outrage is 
conceptualized to have three components that are based in affective, cognitive, and 
behavioral reactions toward a violator of a sacred value. These include (1) harsh 
dispositional attributions, (2) anger, contempt, and/or disgust toward the violator, and (3) 
support for punishing the violator (Tetlock et al., 2000). When people feel as though they 
are morally contaminated by a violator of a sacred value, they may engage in moral 
cleansing. Even the mere contemplation of a sacred value violation can be morally 
contaminating for people (Tetlock et al., 2000). Moral cleansing is closely related to self-
affirmation processes (see Steele, 1988) in which people attempt to rid themselves of a 
moral contaminant by reaffirming themselves as moral. However, in contrast to Steele‟s 
(1988) contention that people can affirm other unrelated aspects of the self to resolve any 
conflicts between cognitions or behavior and cognition, people attempt to rid themselves 
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of a moral contaminant by directly addressing their moral failing. Thus, when people who 
value equal group relations violate racial egalitarianism, they should be motivated to 
repair their moral failing in race relations and may thus perceive more racism in their 
environments.  
 When people encounter immoral social agents, they may respond with moral 
outrage and moral cleansing, which may have different consequences for being attuned to 
other moral contaminants in their environments. People who are morally contaminated by 
an immoral social agent may be motivated to morally cleanse themselves, and this 
motivation is hypothesized to increase people‟s vigilance to opportunities to directly 
confront the contaminant (cf. Steele, 1988; Tetlock et al., 2000). In the case of hate 
groups and racism, people who are morally contaminated by hate groups‟ presence or an 
association with the group (e.g., sharing the same beliefs as hate groups) may then be 
motivated to morally cleanse themselves by seeking opportunities to condemn racism or 
racist people and institutions. Contaminated people may then be more vigilant to racism 
in their environments; they may need to show that they are aware of and reject racism. 
Failures to perceive racism are major deterrents to confronting prejudice (Ashburn-
Nardo, Morris, & Goodwin, 2008). 
 In addition to this heightened vigilance against racism for those who are 
motivated to morally cleanse themselves, there is a debate relevant to how vigilant people 
will be to racism after they have expressed moral outrage and anger-based responses. 
Tetlock et al. (2000) outline two possible strategies people use when confronted with a 
moral contaminant such as hate groups: moral compensation or moral overkill. According 
to the compensatory hypothesis, people express moral outrage that attempts to distance 
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themselves from the contaminant. People therefore compensate for the contaminant by 
directly rejecting it, and they no longer need to do anything else because they adequately 
compensated for its contaminating influence. This compensatory hypothesis has been 
supported by a variety of research on people who deal with potential moral failings (e.g., 
Monin & Miller, 2001; Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009; Schnall, Benton & Harvey, 
2008; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). People who feel morally affirmed or cleansed condone 
future instances of immorality. Monin and Miller (2001) find support for a moral 
credentials model in which people who have demonstrated that they are not racist or 
sexist are more likely to be racist or sexist in future situations than people who did not 
first establish themselves as nonprejudiced. We should expect then in line with this 
compensatory hypothesis that expressing moral outrage against hate groups may relieve 
people of being aware of future instances of racism. According to this compensatory 
hypothesis, people who express moral outrage should be less vigilant to racism than 
people who did not express moral outrage against a hate group. 
 There are theoretical reasons to believe, however, that expressing moral outrage 
against a hate group (vs. not expressing moral outrage) may increase people‟s vigilance 
against racism in their environments in the same manner that people who are motivated to 
morally cleanse themselves are likely to be more vigilant to racism. According to the 
overkill hypothesis, people engage in many and redundant moral reactions when faced 
with a moral contaminant (Tetlock et al., 2000). Instead of being “done” after expressing 
moral outrage against a moral contaminant (i.e., the compensatory hypothesis), people 
may express even more moral outrage and also seek opportunities to morally cleanse 
themselves despite having already expressed moral outrage. People may thus engage in 
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these overkill moral responses when faced with a moral contaminant. The overkill 
hypothesis is likely to be supported when expressing outrage or cleansing oneself is not 
costly and when the moral contaminant is especially extreme in violating a sacred value. 
Tetlock et al. (2000) find support for the overkill hypothesis when the sacred value 
violator is especially egregious. The overkill hypothesis roughly maps onto the 
predictions that would be made by research suggesting that catharsis is not effective in 
alleviating aggressive thoughts and actions (Bushman, 2002). People when exposed to 
hate groups will not merely express outrage and be done, but they will also express more 
outrage later and seek opportunities to morally cleanse themselves. We should expect, 
then, in line with the overkill hypothesis that people who express moral outrage against 
hate groups will be more vigilant to racism in their environments than people who do not 
express moral outrage against hate groups. 
The Present Research 
The present research examines how people perceive hate groups (e.g., as 
immoral), react to hate groups (e.g., moral outrage and moral cleansing), and how people 
who are contaminated by hate groups may be motivated to remain vigilant to racism. The 
present research also compares predictions from two theoretical models that would make 
opposite predictions. According to the moral credentials model (Monin & Miller, 2001), 
people who have established themselves as moral by rejecting prejudice should no longer 
be vigilant to prejudice and may actually behave in more prejudiced ways later. Thus, 
people who express moral outrage against hate groups should perceive less racism in 
their environments than people who have not been able to establish themselves as moral. 
In contrast, the sacred value protection model (Tetlock et al., 2000) predicts an overkill 
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hypothesis in which people who engage in moral outrage will perceive more racism in a 
seemingly redundant defense of a moral contaminant. Also, people who are motivated to 
morally cleanse themselves will perceive more racism in their environments in order to 
directly confront racism.  
Our reasoning here depends on the assumptions that hate groups are in fact 
perceived to be immoral social agents and that people will express moral outrage toward 
them. Experiment 1 tests these assumptions. Experiment 2 tests the prediction that when 
hate groups morally contaminate people, they will subsequently recognize racism in their 
environments more than people who have not been morally contaminated. People will 
perceive more racism in their environments when they have become psychologically 
associated with hate groups (i.e., morally contaminated by them) than people who have 
not become morally contaminated by hate groups because they will be motivated to seek 
opportunities to morally cleanse themselves. Also, with regard to the opposing 
predictions of people‟s vigilance against racism after expressing moral outrage, we seek 
to test whether the compensatory hypothesis or the overkill hypothesis are supported after 
people express moral outrage against a hate group (Tetlock et al., 2000). The present 
research explores how hate groups can make people more or less vigilant to racism in 
their environments, which can have important implications for confronting prejudice and 
seeking egalitarian group relations. 
Pilot Study 
 We conducted a pilot study drawn from the same population as the experimental 
participants to identify the groups with which our participants had the most familiarity 
and could identify correctly. We included a variety of hate groups, politically liberal 
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groups, and politically conservative groups to see if such groups are familiar to 
participants and could correctly identify them as racist, liberal, or conservative. 
Method 
 Participants. We recruited 67 undergraduate students to participate in this study 
for partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were 61% male, 81% white, 
and 19 years old on average. 
 Procedure. Participants were invited to a large lecture room where they 
completed ratings of 45 groups. We used the names of 15 hate groups identified by the 
Southern Poverty Law Center. We identified another 15 groups that were politically 
liberal organizations according to their self identification and from their mission 
statements (e.g., MoveOn and League of Women Voters). We also identified 15 groups 
that were politically conservative organizations according to their self identification and 
from their mission statements (e.g., Focus on the Family and Alliance Defense Fund). We 
administered four versions of the survey that randomly presented all 45 groups in four 
different orders to participants. 
 Measures.  Participants rated each group on how familiar, racist, liberal, and 
conservative they thought each group was. They rated each group on a scale from 1 (not 
at all familiar, racist, liberal, or conservative) to 7 (very familiar, racist, liberal, or 
conservative). 
Results and Discussion 
 Table 1 displays the complete listing of the groups that participants rated, 
followed by the type of organization (i.e., hate, liberal, or conservative), descriptive 
statistics of the measures for each group, and whether or not participants correctly 
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identified the organization‟s type (i.e., hate, liberal, or conservative). Participants 
reported being familiar with six of the 45 groups, as indicated by familiarity scores above 
the midpoint of the rating scale (i.e., greater than 3.5). Among the 39 groups that were 
rated as unfamiliar, participants reported being equally unfamiliar with the hate 
(M=1.81), liberal (M=1.70), and conservative (M=1.73) groups, F (2, 132) =1.54, p>.10. 
Participants, in general, were unfamiliar with hate, liberal, and conservative groups, 
which suggests that participants may not be vigilant to prejudice or bias because they do 
not know what these political groups are. 
Participants correctly classified the following six groups as racist, liberal, or 
conservative. Skinheads were rated as more racist (M=6.28) than it was rated liberal 
(M=2.55) and conservative (M=4.87), F (1, 61) = 131.09, p<.001, d=2.93. The Ku Klux 
Klan was rated as more racist (M=6.55) than liberal (M=2.25) and conservative 
(M=5.19), F (1, 63) = 146.29, p<.001, d=3.05. The Democratic Party was rated as more 
liberal (M=6.02) than conservative (M=2.14) and racist (M=1.80), F (1, 64) = 334.07, 
p<.001, d=4.57. Planned Parenthood was rated as more liberal (M=5.34) than 
conservative (M=2.70) and racist (M=1.32), F (1, 62) = 107.21, p<.001, d=2.63. The 
Republican Party was rated as more conservative (M=6.02) than liberal (M=2.18) and 
racist (M=3.22), F (1, 64) = 158.89, p<.001, d=3.15. The National Rifle Association was 
rated as more conservative (M=5.20) than liberal (M=2.90) and racist (M=2.37), F (1, 58) 
= 174.04, p<.001, d=3.46. Participants were able to correctly identify the Ku Klux Klan 
and Skinheads as racist organizations, which suggests that these groups are exemplars of 
the hate group category for participants. This finding suggests that exposure to the Ku 
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Klux Klan and Skinheads could morally contaminate participants because participants 
recognize them as racist organizations. 
Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 tests the basic assumptions and hypotheses that hate groups are seen 
as immoral social agents, who will evoke moral outrage. We randomly assigned 
participants to conditions in which they were told that an argument against immigration 
came from either the KKK, Republican Party, or American Atheists in a between-
subjects design. The KKK was used to represent hate groups because they express a 
variety of sociopolitical views, whereas Skinheads are not particularly political (Berlet & 
Vysotsky, 2006). Also, the KKK was seen as an exemplar of racist organizations, as 
identified in the pilot study, so they would be most likely to evoke moral outrage. 
Because Americans view atheists as immoral social agents (Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann, 
2006), we selected them as a control group in this experiment. If the KKK is seen as 
more immoral than or just as immoral as atheists, then we would find convergent 
evidence that the KKK is seen as an immoral social agent. The Republican Party was 
selected as a third control group because they hold some of the same sociopolitical views 
as the KKK (e.g., anti-immigration, anti-affirmative action, and so on), but they are not 
overtly racist like the KKK. The inclusion of the Republican Party controls for the effect 
of political conservatism in the perception of immorality and moral outrage against 
violations to racial equality. 
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Method 
 Participants. We recruited 85 undergraduate students who participated in this 
experiment for partial course credit. Participants were 60% female, 77% white, and 19 
years old on average. 
 Procedure. Participants read an argument in favor of anti-immigration policies, 
which is shown in Appendix A. After participants read the argument, we measured moral 
outrage against the groups and perceptions of morality. Participants completed 
demographic information, the 16 item social dominance orientation scale (Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), and a measure of political orientation. Participants 
were debriefed and thanked for their time. 
 Measures. Participants completed measures of moral outrage, perceptions of 
morality, social dominance orientation, and political orientation. 
 Moral Outrage. Participants completed a six item measure of moral outrage 
(α=.91) adapted from Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, and Green (2000). Two items were selected 
to represent each component of moral outrage and were rated on a scale from 1 to 7 
(except for the second punish violator item indicated below) with different anchors for 
each item, which are shown in brackets next. The items measuring harsh dispositional 
attributions were “Someone who is willing to join this group is [very compassionate/very 
cruel]” and “This group is [not at all offensive/highly offensive].” The items measuring 
emotional responses to the group were “This group evokes [no anger/a great deal of 
anger]” and “This group is [not at all offensive/highly offensive].” The items measuring 
support for punishing the violator were “This group [should be banned/should be 
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permitted]” and “I would like to [seek out/avoid] this group‟s company.” This latter item 
was measured on a scale from 1 to 9. 
 Perceptions of Morality. Participants rated how immoral they thought the group 
was with one item on a scale from 1 (highly moral) to 7 (highly immoral).  
 Social Dominance Orientation. Participants completed the 16 item social 
dominance orientation scale (α=.87; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), which 
has traditionally been used to measure the extent to which people desire unequal group 
relations. This interpretation of the scale, however, focuses on only one pole of the scale. 
For our purposes, we reverse coded the social dominance orientation scale to measure 
how much people desire equal group relations. Participants rated these 16 items on a 
scale from 1 (strongly oppose) to 7 (strongly favor), and example items include 
“Increased social equality” and “Inferior groups should stay in their place.”  
 Political Orientation. Participants self reported their political orientation using 
the political economic conservatism scale reported by Pratto et al. (1994). This scale 
consisted of three items asking participants to indicate how liberal or conservative they 
were on a scale from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative) on social, economic, and 
foreign policy issues (α=.87). 
Results 
 Table 2 displays the correlation matrix for all study variables both for the entire 
sample and split by condition. 
Perceptions of Morality. We conducted a one-way analysis of variance with the 
source of the argument as the independent variable and perceptions of morality as the 
dependent variable. We found a significant main effect for the source of the argument on 
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perceptions of morality, F (2, 82) = 8.11, p<.001. Tukey multiple comparison tests reveal 
that the Ku Klux Klan (M=5.72) was seen as more immoral than the Republican Party 
(M=4.54) (d=.91; 95% confidence interval for the mean difference was .54, 1.84) and 
American Atheists (M=4.64) (d=.79; 95% confidence interval for the mean difference 
was .43, 1.73).  
 Because we expected that the KKK would represent a violator of the racial 
equality sacred value, we predicted that the KKK would be seen as especially immoral 
among people who desire equal group relations. Among the 85 participants in this study, 
three participants fell below the midpoint of the social dominance orientation reverse 
coded scale. Thus, it would not be radical to suggest that virtually all of our participants 
value group-based equality. However, to compare participants who may moderately 
desire group based equality to participants who extremely desire group based equality, 
we ran regression analysis with indicator variables for each of the three conditions (i.e., 
KKK, Republican Party, and American Atheists), reverse coded social dominance 
orientation, and the interactions between each condition indicator and social dominance 
orientation. We centered social dominance orientation to avoid multicollinearity and to 
aid in interpretation (see Jaccard, Wan, & Turrisi, 1990). We found that the KKK was 
seen as more immoral than the Republican Party (β=.39, t(79)=3.49, p<.001) and 
American Atheists (β=.34, t(79)=3.02, p<.01), controlling for the mean level of social 
dominance orientation and the interaction effects. Figure 1 displays a box plot of our 
results. Also, social dominance orientation was a significant predictor of how immoral 
the groups were perceived. People who extremely desired equal group relations were 
more likely to see each group as more immoral than people who moderately desired equal 
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group relations, β=.22, p<.05. Social dominance orientation did not significantly interact 
with any of the indicator variables for the experimental conditions, |t(79)|<1. 
 Moral Outrage. We conducted a one-way analysis of variance with the source of 
the argument as the independent variable and moral outrage as the dependent variable. 
We found a significant main effect for the source of the argument on perceptions of 
morality, F (2, 82) = 14.28, p<.001. Tukey multiple comparison tests reveal that the Ku 
Klux Klan (M=6.10) was seen as more immoral than the Republican Party (M=4.67) 
(d=1.21; 95% confidence interval for the mean difference was .81, 2.06) and American 
Atheists (M=4.63) (d=1.29; 95% confidence interval for the mean difference was .81, 
2.10). The mean levels indicate that although participants expressed moral outrage 
against all three groups on average, the Ku Klux Klan was rated extremely so by almost 
all participants. 
 We wanted to test whether people who desire group-based equality would be 
especially morally outraged against the KKK than they would be against the Republican 
Party or American Atheists, which would be represented by a significant interaction 
between social dominance orientation and experimental condition. Therefore, we 
conducted a linear regression analysis with indicator variables for each of the three 
conditions (i.e., KKK, Republican Party, and American Atheists), reverse coded social 
dominance orientation, and the interactions between each condition indicator and social 
dominance orientation. Again, we centered social dominance orientation. Figure 2 
displays a box plot of our results. We found that people expressed more moral outrage 
against the KKK than against the Republican Party (β=.44, t(81)=4.54, p<.001) and 
American Atheists (β=.44, t(81)=4.46, p<.001), controlling for the mean level of social 
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dominance orientation and the interaction effects. The interaction effects between social 
dominance orientation and the indicator variables for the sources of the argument were 
not significant, |t(81)|<1. Participants who strongly desire equal group relations were 
more likely to express moral outrage against all groups than participants who moderately 
desired equal group relations, β=.42, p<.01.  
Discussion 
 Consistent with our hypotheses, participants saw the KKK as more immoral than 
the Republican Party and American Atheists, even though the same policy ideas were 
attributed to each group. Because atheists are already seen as immoral in the U.S. (Edgell, 
Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006), we found support for the idea that hate groups are seen as 
immoral because they were seen as even more immoral than atheists. Participants also 
expressed more moral outrage against the KKK than toward the Republican Party and 
American Atheists, even though the argument against immigration attributed to each 
group was the same. Participants who valued group equality were more likely to view 
each group as immoral and to express moral outrage than participants who did not value 
group equality as much. These findings suggest that among those people who value group 
equality, the KKK can evoke moral outrage because they are seen as immoral for 
violating the racial equality sacred value. Because participants read an argument against 
immigration to the U.S., all sources of the arguments (i.e., KKK, Republican Party, and 
American Atheists) violated the racial equality sacred value, which may explain the lack 
of an interaction between social dominance orientation and the source of the arguments. 
However, the KKK was seen as more immoral and evoked more moral outrage than the 
Republican Party and American Atheists.  
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Experiment 2 
 Hate groups sometimes use subtle, persuasive messages to promote their 
ideologies, so people may not always express moral outrage in response to hierarchy-
enhancing racist messages. Instead, people can become “contaminated” by hate groups, 
which we suggest will cause people to actively seek opportunities to morally cleanse 
themselves. We predict in Experiment 2 that seeking to morally cleanse oneself will lead 
to greater vigilance for racism in one's environment than people who do not seek to 
morally cleanse themselves. The moral credentials model (Monin & Miller, 2001) 
predicts that people who express moral outrage will not perceive as much racism in their 
environments than participants who did not express moral outrage. The sacred value 
protection model (Tetlock et al., 2000) predicts that people who engage in overkill moral 
defensive processes, so people who express moral outrage should perceive just as much 
racism as participants who seek to morally cleanse themselves. We test these opposing 
models in the present experiment. 
Method 
 Participants. We recruited 150 undergraduate students to participate in partial 
fulfillment of a course requirement. Participants were 71% female, 69% white, and 19 
years old on average. 
 Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions that 
manipulated whether the participants knew the source of some arguments against 
affirmative action. The arguments are shown in Appendix B. In the before-argument 
condition, participants read arguments against affirmative action and were told up front 
that these arguments came from the Ku Klux Klan website. These arguments actually 
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came from a blog posting on stormfront.org, a popular racist website. Participants were 
then asked “Please write about the merits of the arguments, if any exist.” They then wrote 
a free response to this prompt in which they could agree or disagree with the arguments, 
although the wording of the instructions suggests that participants should write about the 
ways in which they agree with the arguments. The default task for participants was to 
agree with the arguments, so participants had to actively disagree with the arguments if 
they wanted. In the after-argument condition, participants read the same arguments 
against affirmative action, but they were not told the source of the arguments. They then 
were asked “Please write about the merits of the arguments, if any exist.” After they 
wrote about the merits of the arguments, they were told that those arguments were made 
by the Ku Klux Klan. Thus, participants who agreed with the arguments were lead to 
think that they shared the same beliefs as the KKK, which is morally contaminating for 
those who value group-based equality. A third condition was an untreated control group, 
where participants read the arguments and then were asked to “Please write about the 
merits of arguments if any exist” without any mention of the KKK.  
 After this knowledge-of-source manipulation, all participants completed a 
measure of positive and negative affect, and they then read parts of a mission statement 
from the Council for Conservative Citizens, which is a covert hate group identified by the 
Southern Poverty Law Center. This mission statement contains 14 parts that represent the 
views and beliefs of the Council for Conservative Citizens. In the pilot study reported 
above, each part was rated on how racist it was perceived to be from 1 (not at all racist) 
to 7 (very racist). Two parts of the mission statement were selected for use in this 
experiment because they were perceived to be moderately racist, represented by racist 
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perception scores ranging around the midpoint of the scale (i.e., approximately 3.5). Part 
two of the mission statement was selected because it specifically concerned the 
organization‟s views of race in the U.S. All 14 parts of the mission statement are 
displayed in Appendix C along with how racist, liberal, and conservative they were 
perceived to be by the 67 pilot participants. The three parts selected for use in Experiment 
2 are presented first. We suggest that these three parts could be seen as ambiguously 
racist or not racist and still represent the organization‟s views on race in the U.S. 
 After reading these three parts to the mission statement, participants completed an 
adapted version of the symbolic racism 2000 scale (Henry & Sears, 2002) to assess how 
racist participants thought the organization was. Participants then completed measures of 
social dominance orientation, political orientation, anti-black prejudice, and demographic 
information and then debriefed and thanked for their time. 
Measures. 
Perceptions of Racism. We adapted a measure of symbolic racism from the scale 
reported in Henry and Sears (2002). Six items were used to create our measure of how 
racist participants thought the group was (α=.69). Appendix D displays the complete 
scale, including all anchors. Instead of the items from the symbolic racism 2000 scale 
referencing the how participants themselves would respond to the items, we adapted the 
items to reference how the group whose mission statement they just read might respond 
the items. For example, the original item on the symbolic racism 2000 scale was “Over 
the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.” Our 
parallel adapted item was “This organization believes that over the past few years, blacks 
have gotten more than they deserve.” 
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Positive and Negative Affect. Participants completed the 20 item positive and 
negative affect schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Participants rated how they 
currently feel on 10 words denoting positive affect (α=.90; e.g., interested, strong, 
enthusiastic) and on 10 words denoting negative affect (α=.85; e.g., upset, scared, 
ashamed) on a scale from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). 
Other Measures. Participants completed the same measures of social dominance 
orientation (α=.91) and political orientation (α=.86) as they did in Experiment 1. 
Additionally, participants completed the 20 item Attitudes Toward Blacks scale (α=.81; 
Brigham, 1993). Some example items include “Black and white people are inherently 
equal” and “Generally, blacks are not as smart as whites.” Participants rated these items 
on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Results 
 Coding of Agreement with the Argument. Participants were asked to “write 
about the merits of the argument” against affirmative action in a free response format.  
We decided to make agreement the default because the prompt for the free response lead 
participants to agree with the arguments if they followed experimenter demand. If there 
were no explicit disagreements with the arguments, participants were coded as agreeing 
with the arguments, although this may have been due in part to experimenter demand and 
the wording of the prompt. They were asked to “Please write about the merits of the 
arguments, if any exist.” If participants indicated any form of disagreement with the 
arguments, they were coded as disagreeing with the arguments, and this behavior can be 
considered proactive given the wording of the prompt.  Two coders, blind to 
experimental condition, coded each participant‟s response as either agreeing (coded as a 
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„0‟) or disagreeing (coded as a „1‟). The inter-rater agreement for this coding was good 
(κ=.75). Disagreements were settled after discussion. 
 Positive and Negative Affect. We conducted a multivariate analysis of variance 
with positive and negative affect as the two dependent variables (higher scores indicate 
greater experience of affect) and with condition (i.e., before-argument, after-argument, 
control) and agreement (i.e., agree or disagree with the arguments) as the independent 
variables. We found a marginally significant main effect of agreement with the argument 
on positive and negative affect (F (2, 143) = 2.64, p < .10). The condition effect and the 
interaction between condition and agreement were not significant (Fs<1). Participants 
experienced the same levels of positive and negative affect in the outrage (Mp=2.84; 
Mn=1.47), contamination (Mp=2.64; Mn=1.53), and control (Mp=2.59; Mn=1.53).  
Univariate tests reveal that participants who disagreed with the argument experienced 
greater negative affect (M=1.61) than participants who agreed with the argument 
(M=1.29), t (148) = 2.28, p<.05, d=.37. Despite this significant mean difference, the 
mean levels of negative affect were at the bottom of the scale, so participants did not 
experience very much negative affect. 
 Perceptions of Racism. We conducted a two-way analysis of variance with 
knowledge-of-source condition (i.e., before-argument, after-argument, control) and 
agreement (i.e., agree or disagree with the arguments) as the independent variables and 
our adapted symbolic racism measure as the dependent variable. We did not find 
significant main effects for condition (F (2, 144) < 1) or the agreement factors (F (1, 144) 
<1). We did, however, find a marginally significant interaction effect of agreement and 
condition on perceptions of symbolic racism, F (2, 144) = 2.83, p=.06. Because symbolic 
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racism has bases in political conservatism and old-fashioned racism (Henry & Sears, 
2002) and because hate groups are perceived to violate the racial equality sacred value by 
being racist (Experiment 1), we statistically controlled for the effects of political 
orientation, attitudes toward blacks, and social dominance orientation. When controlling 
for all three of these covariates, we found a significant interaction effect of agreement 
and condition on perceptions of symbolic racism, F (2, 141) = 3.07, p<.05. Table 3 
displays the adjusted means for perceptions of symbolic racism. Our treatment 
comparisons are conducted using this model controlling for political orientation, attitudes 
toward blacks, and social dominance orientation. 
We were interested in four treatment comparisons. Figure 3 displays a box plot of 
the results (see Lane & Sandor, 2009). We were interested in whether becoming 
contaminated by the KKK would make people perceive more racism in their 
environments, which occurred in the after-argument condition when participants agreed 
with the arguments made. We will compare this condition to the cases where (1) 
participants were not contaminated by the KKK (i.e., in the after-argument condition 
when they disagreed with the arguments), (2) participants knew the arguments came from 
the KKK (before-argument condition) and disagreed with them, (3) participants knew the 
arguments came from the KKK (before-argument condition) and agreed with them, and 
(4) participants agreed with the arguments but the KKK was never mentioned (i.e., 
control condition). 
(1) Participants who were morally contaminated by the KKK perceived more 
racism in the mission statement (M=4.30) than participants who were not morally 
contaminated by the KKK (M=3.88), F (1, 144) = 3.83, p=.05, d=.55. (2) Participants 
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who were morally contaminated by the KKK did not perceive more racism in the mission 
statement (M=4.30) than participants who knew the arguments came from the KKK and 
disagreed with them (M=4.2), F (1, 141) <1, d=.14. (3) Participants who were morally 
contaminated by the KKK perceived more racism in the mission statement (M=4.30) than 
participants who knew the arguments came from the KKK and agreed with the arguments 
(M=3.85), F (1, 141) = 4.73, p<.05, d=.59. (4) Participants who were morally 
contaminated by KKK did not perceive more racism in the mission statement (M=4.30) 
than participants who agreed with the arguments but were never told about the KKK 
(M=4.01), F (1, 141) = 1.91, p>.10, d=.37. 
Discussion 
 We hypothesized the participants who were motivated to morally cleanse 
themselves would perceive more racism in their environment than participants who were 
not motivated to morally cleanse themselves. Participants who were morally 
contaminated by the Ku Klux Klan perceived more racism than participants who 
disagreed with the arguments against affirmative action and were subsequently told that 
the arguments came from the KKK. We also found support for the sacred value 
protection model‟s (Tetlock et al., 2000) prediction that people would engage in moral 
overkill and perceive more racism after engaging in moral outrage. We also found 
support for the compensatory hypothesis. When participants first disagreed with the 
arguments and were then told that the arguments came from the KKK, they perceived 
less racism than participants who agreed with the arguments and were then told that they 
came from the KKK. Thus, in the conditions where participants disagreed with the 
arguments—both before and after the source of those arguments was known, we found 
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support for both the overkill and compensatory hypotheses. When participants knew that 
arguments came from the KKK at the outset, they engaged in overkill moral reactions 
and increased their vigilance against racism. Disagreeing with the arguments first without 
knowing the source may have established participants as nonprejudiced, and they may 
have been unaffected—and perhaps relieved—when they found out that the arguments 
came from the KKK.  Because the KKK represents an extreme violation of racial 
equality, people may be especially motivated to rid themselves of racism and thus be 
more vigilant about perceiving racism.  
General Discussion 
 The purpose of the present research was to investigate whether people perceive 
hate groups as immoral social agents who evoke moral outrage and how people may react 
to the morally contaminating influence of hate groups in the U.S. We found support for 
the hypothesis that hate groups are perceived to be immoral social agents and that they 
evoke moral outrage among those who value group-based equality. Many hate groups, 
such as the Ku Klux Klan, violate a racial egalitarian ideology, which causes people who 
desire equal group relations to express moral outrage. Despite their overtly racist and 
prejudiced missions, hate groups are adapting their propaganda to conform to social 
norms of racial equality by focusing on ingroup favoritism (e.g., white power) instead of 
outgroup derogation (e.g., overtly blaming black people for problems in society).  
We were interested in the ways that exposure to hate groups may increase 
people‟s perceptions of racism in ambiguously racist discourse. We found that 
participants who were lead to believe that they share compatible beliefs about affirmative 
action with the Ku Klux Klan perceived more racism in an ambiguously racist mission 
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statement than participants who were not lead to believe that they share compatible 
beliefs about affirmative action with the KKK. Participants who expressed moral outrage 
by disagreeing with the KKK perceived the same level of racism in the mission statement 
than participants who were motivated to morally cleanse themselves. This latter finding 
supports the overkill hypothesis proposed by the sacred value protection model (Tetlock 
et al., 2000) and does not support the prediction made by the moral credentials model 
(Monin & Miller, 2001). However, participants who disagreed with the arguments and 
were then told that they came from the KKK—thereby establishing themselves as 
nonracist—perceived less racism than participants who were morally contaminated by the 
KKK, which supports the compensatory hypothesis and moral credentials model. The 
present study, in all, explored people‟s perceptions of and reactions to hate groups in the 
United States. 
Overkill or Compensation 
 The Ku Klux Klan and other hate groups represent an extremist group in the 
discourse surrounding race relations in the U.S. Because of this, they are very likely to 
evoke strong moral reactions among those who value racial equality. When people are 
confronted with such an extreme moral transgressor, they engage in moral protection 
processes that may be redundant and appear irrational (i.e., overkill hypothesis; Tetlock 
et al., 2000). When moral reactions to sacred value violators (e.g., moral outrage and 
moral cleansing) are relatively easy to do and when the violator is especially intolerable, 
people seek many opportunities to engage in moral outrage and to morally cleanse, which 
may include both expressing moral outrage and seeking out ways to morally cleanse 
oneself. We found evidence of the overkill hypothesis in Experiment 2. Tetlock et al. 
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(2000) predict that when outrage or cleansing are not easy to do or when the violation is 
not as serious, people may engage in compensatory actions (e.g., merely expressing 
moral outrage) that require no further cognitive, affective, or behavioral moral work.  
This compensatory hypothesis is the one advocated by Monin and Miller‟s (2001) 
moral credentials model. When people establish themselves as moral by fighting against 
prejudice, they no longer need to “prove” themselves to be non-prejudiced. We found 
support for this model as well. Typically, this model is tested with a less extreme instance 
of prejudice than hate groups (e.g., discriminatory hiring between a black or white 
applicant) where establishing moral credentials can relieve people of the problem of 
doing something about prejudice. When participants did not know the source and 
disagreed with the arguments, they may have established themselves as nonracist. Once 
these participants knew the source of the arguments, it further established them as 
nonracist because they did not see themselves as similar to the KKK. They then 
perceived less racism in the mission statement because they had already earned their 
moral license as nonracist people. 
 Because hate groups threaten sacred values and can morally contaminate people 
within a moral community, they evoke strong moral reactions and defensive strategies 
that do not let people escape as easily from moral transgressions against racial 
egalitarianism. We suggest that contaminating people with the reality of hate groups—an 
extreme moral transgressor—in the U.S. may motivate extended action and vigilance 
against racism in one‟s environment, which can motivate people to behave in egalitarian 
ways. Dismissing the influence of overt agents of prejudice can make people less aware 
of the variety of expressions of prejudice, which can contribute to the idea that prejudice 
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and discrimination are no longer problems. Revealing the source of hierarchy-enhancing 
political discourse can motivate people to label that discourse for what it is (e.g., racist, 
sexist, and so on).  
After Perceiving Racism 
 One of the major deterrents to engaging in prosocial bystander behavior is not 
noticing that something is happening and not interpreting it as a problem (Ashburn-
Nardo, Morris, Goodwin, 2008; Latane & Darley, 1970). The present experiments 
suggest that hate groups can be used to get people to realize that racism exists and that it 
is a problem. The next steps include ensuring that people are responsible for acting 
against racism and providing people with behavioral skills to actually engage in 
hierarchy-attenuating behavior. A 2009 Gallup poll showed that 49% of white Americans 
believe racism against blacks is widespread while 78% of blacks believe racism is 
widespread (Newport, 2009). Thus, approximately half of white Americans do not 
believe that racism is a problem, so they may not believe that they could do something to 
solve a problem that they do not believe even exists.  
Making people aware of racism in their environments may provide a contrast to 
their belief in racial equality. When people believe they have engaged in racist ways, they 
may be motivated to change the way they respond to be more consistent with their 
egalitarian beliefs (Monteith & Mark, 2005). Getting people to believe that racism exists 
is the first hurdle that exposure to hate groups and potentially other blatant forms of 
racism help to eliminate. By exposing people to their own ideological inconsistencies 
(e.g., racism and egalitarianism), we can induce cognitive dissonance that may motivate a 
change in people‟s prejudiced ways (Monteith & Mark, 2005). Using hate groups or other 
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extreme instances of racism and prejudice can help to ensure that people cannot just 
affirm another unrelated aspect of their self (Steele, 1988) but instead must confront 
racism itself (Tetlock et al., 2000).  
 Merely educating people about the problems of racism, however, is not enough to 
motivate vigilance against racism. As we show in Experiment 2, vigilance against racism 
occurs once people become morally contaminated by hate groups (i.e., there is increased 
overlap between people‟s belief systems and hate groups‟ belief systems). When people 
distance themselves from racial inequality by rejecting anti-affirmative action arguments 
first and are then told that the arguments come from a hate group, they become less 
vigilant to racism than when people do not reject those arguments and are then told that 
they come from a hate group. This finding suggests that in order to motivate vigilance 
against racism, people must feel morally contaminated by the problem. They must feel as 
though they are part of the problem and must therefore confront it. It appears as though 
when people realize that they are an actor and contributor of a larger systemic problem of 
hierarchy and oppression, they can be motivated to be vigilant to the problem and 
perhaps act more in line with egalitarianism and other hierarchy-attenuating ideologies. 
Future research can extend the model we explored in the present thesis by understanding 
the hierarchy-attenuating behavioral implications of being vigilant to racism in one‟s 
environment (e.g., confronting racist remarks; Ashburn-Nardo, Morris, & Goodwin, 
2008). 
Spatial Moral Contamination 
 We predict that people can be morally contaminated in spatial terms in addition to 
the psychological contamination participants experienced in Experiment 2. By telling 
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people that hate groups operate in their own communities or that they will come to visit 
the places that people live their lives (e.g., homes, restaurants, malls, and so on), people 
may feel morally contaminated, which can induce moral cleansing and moral outrage 
processes. In order to cleanse a proximal moral contaminant, people may have to 
physically remove the contaminant. With regard to hate groups living in a community, 
people may be ideologically required to engage in social activism and work to physically 
remove hate groups from one‟s community. Research on collective action (see van 
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008) can inform how people may engage in collective 
action to successfully protest against the morally contaminating presence of hate groups 
in people‟s communities. Hate groups can provide a strong ideological contrast that 
motivates people to change their physical ecology in order to follow more directly from 
their egalitarian ideals. Future research can investigate this hypothesis to see if hate 
groups can be used to propagate anti-racist and egalitarian group relations. 
Conclusion 
 Even though contemporary research on prejudice suggests that it may be hidden 
(Henry & Sears, 2002), subtle (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997), or implicit (Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), overt forms of prejudice still operate in contemporary 
society. Focusing on the covert forms of prejudice may distract psychological research 
from examining the influence of overt forms of prejudice that may still have influence in 
society. Hate groups, for example, can morally contaminate people when they are aware 
that they exist, and they can subsequently motivate people to perceive racism in their 
environments—one of the greatest hurdles to prosocial behavior. The present research 
explores the contaminating influence of hate groups in the U.S. and seeks to explore how 
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they can be used to provide an ideological contrast to people‟s egalitarian beliefs and 
motivate vigilance against racism. 
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 Table 1 
List of Groups Rated in Pilot Study on Ratings of How Familiar, Liberal, Conservative, and Racist the Groups were Perceived to Be 
Group Name Type of Group Familiarity 
Ratings 
Liberal Ratings Conservative 
Ratings 
Racism Ratings Identified 
Correctly 
Accuracy in 
Media 
Conservative 2.36 (1.87) 
N=66 
4.66 (1.`67) 
N=58 
3.57 (1.73) 
N=58 
2.44 (1.67) 
N=59 
No 
Alliance 
Defense Fund 
Conservative 1.40 (.97) 
N=67 
3.56 (1.48) 
N=54 
4.19 (1.42) 
N=54 
2.39 (1.55) 
N=54 
Yes 
American 
Conservative 
Union 
Conservative 1.62 (1.27) 
N=65 
1.91 (1.44) 
N=58 
6.09 (1.42) 
N=58 
2.75 (1.46) 
N=57 
Yes 
American 
Values Agenda 
Conservative 1.38 (1.04) 
N=67 
3.36 (1.58) 
N=53 
4.04 (1.64) 
N=52 
2.62 (1.63) 
N=52 
Yes 
Christian 
Coalition of 
America 
Conservative 2.12 (1.59) 
N=66 
2.72 (1.59) 
N=57 
5.39 (1.46) 
N=59 
2.76 (1.73) 
N=58 
Yes 
Citizens for the 
Republic 
Conservative 1.79 (1.49) 
N=67 
3.16 (1.40) 
N=55 
4.29 (1.59) 
N=56 
2.70 (1.59) 
N=56 
Yes 
 Group Name Type of Group Familiarity 
Ratings 
Liberal Ratings Conservative 
Ratings 
Racism Ratings Identified 
Correctly 
Council for the 
Defense of 
Freedom 
Conservative 1.79 (1.46) 
N=67 
4.05 (1.68) 
N=57 
3.95 (1.73) 
N=57 
2.39 (1.58) 
N=57 
No 
Democracy 
Alliance 
Conservative 1.94 (1.45) 
N=66 
4.67 (1.72) 
N=55 
3.13 (1.63) 
N=55 
2.04 (1.32) 
N=55 
No 
Faith and 
Family Alliance 
Conservative 1.66 (1.23) 
N=65 
2.98 (1.59) 
N=57 
4.67 (1.75) 
N=57 
2.39 (1.37) 
N=57 
Yes 
Focus on the 
Family 
Conservative 1.83 (1.49) 
N=66 
3.60 (1.65) 
N=55 
4.45 (1.64) 
N=55 
2.02 (1.38) 
N=55 
Yes 
Institute for 
Foreign Policy 
Analysis 
Conservative 1.48 (.93) 
N=66 
3.67 (1.69) 
N=54 
3.57 (1.62) 
N=54 
2.39 (1.50) 
N=54 
No 
National Rifle 
Association 
Conservative 3.74 (2.13) 
N=66 
2.90 (1.91) 
N=60 
5.20 (1.79) 
N=59 
2.37 (1.60) 
N=60 
Yes 
Republican 
Party 
Conservative 5.37 (1.82) 
N=67 
2.18 (1.45) 
N=65 
6.02 (1.40) 
N=66 
3.22 (1.69) 
N=65 
Yes 
 Group Name Type of Group Familiarity 
Ratings 
Liberal Ratings Conservative 
Ratings 
Racism Ratings Identified 
Correctly 
Rightroots Conservative 1.15 (.71) 
N=66 
3.73 (1.48) 
N=49 
3.65 (1.49) 
N=49 
2.79 (1.62) 
N=49 
No 
Young 
Americans for 
Freedom 
Conservative 1.75 (1.42) 
N=67 
5.26 (1.63) 
N=53 
2.92 (1.45) 
N=53 
2.19 (1.65) 
N=53 
No 
20/20 Vision Liberal 1.53 (1.34) 
N=66 
3.60 (1.77) 
N=52 
3.06 (1.56) 
N=52 
2.37 (1.73) 
N=52 
Yes 
Alliance for 
Democracy 
Liberal 2.17 (1.58) 
N=65 
4.80 (1.84) 
N=60 
3.03 (1.68) 
N=60 
1.92 (1.38) 
N=60 
Yes 
Democratic 
Party 
Liberal 5.36 (1.65) 
N=66 
6.02 (1.12) 
N=65 
2.14 (1.16) 
N=65 
1.80 (1.35) 
N=65 
Yes 
Democratic 
Socialists of 
America 
Liberal 2.24 (1.46) 
N=67 
5.14 (1.75) 
N=58 
2.66 (1.76) 
N=58 
2.17 (1.43) 
N=58 
Yes 
Emily‟s List Liberal 1.09 (.62) 
N=67 
3.63 (1.62) 
N=49 
2.98 (1.38) 
N=49 
2.34 (1.51) 
N=49 
Yes 
 Group Name Type of Group Familiarity 
Ratings 
Liberal Ratings Conservative 
Ratings 
Racism Ratings Identified 
Correctly 
Institute for 
America‟s 
Future 
Liberal 1.44 (.99) 
N=66 
4.43 (1.62) 
N=53 
3.49 (1.58) 
N=53 
2.21 (1.42) 
N=53 
Yes 
League of 
Women Voters 
Liberal 2.41 (1.71) 
N=66 
5.46 (1.76) 
N=61 
2.67 (1.79) 
N=60 
1.89 (1.47) 
N=61 
Yes 
MoveOn Liberal 1.24 (.78) 4.06 (1.67) 
N=52 
3.21 (1.51) 
N=52 
2.85 (1.81) 
N=52 
Yes 
New 
Beginnings 
Liberal 1.39 (1.01) 
N=66 
4.02 (1.67) 
N=51 
3.26 (1.45) 
N=50 
2.27 (1.51) 
N=51 
Yes 
Planned 
Parenthood 
Liberal 4.67 (1.96) 
N=66 
5.34 (1.84) 
N=64 
2.70 (1.76) 
N=64 
1.32 (.82) 
N=63 
Yes 
Pride 
Foundation 
Liberal 1.56 (1.23) 
N=66 
4.47 (1.77) 
N=55 
3.29 (1.62) 
N=55 
2.36 (1.44) 
N=55 
Yes 
Progressive 
Majority 
Liberal 1.51 (1.25) 
N=67 
4.45 (1.59) 
N=53 
3.11 (1.27) 
N=53 
2.98 (1.92) 
N=53 
Yes 
 Group Name Type of Group Familiarity 
Ratings 
Liberal Ratings Conservative 
Ratings 
Racism Ratings Identified 
Correctly 
Public Citizen Liberal 2.00 (1.81) 
N=66) 
3.85 (1.41) 
N=53 
3.53 (1.32) 
N=53 
2.74 (1.42) 
N=53 
Yes 
True Majority Liberal 1.51 (1.25) 
N=67 
3.96 (1.64) 
N=52 
3.52 (1.61) 
N=52 
2.83 (1.78) 
N=52 
Yes 
Working for 
Change 
Liberal 1.72 (1.42) 
N=67 
4.80 (1.72) 
N=54 
3.07 (1.61) 
N=54 
2.13 (1.54) 
N=54 
Yes 
Aryan Nations Hate 2.77 (2.08) 
N=64 
2.63 (1.70) 
N=56 
5.00 (1.79) 
N=56 
5.22 (2.04) 
N=58 
Yes 
Black Metal Hate 1.28 (1.07) 
N=67 
3.51 (1.56) 
N=49 
3.37 (1.65) 
N=49 
3.18 (1.85) 
N=50 
No 
Christian 
Identity 
Hate 2.51 (2.02) 
N=67 
2.80 (1.79) 
N=56 
5.37 (1.64) 
N=57 
2.89 (1.72) 
N=57 
No 
Council of 
Conservative 
Citizens 
Hate 1.83 (1.30) 
N=67 
1.62 (.99) 
N=55 
6.35 (1.11) 
N=55 
3.04 (1.73) 
N=54 
No 
 Group Name Type of Group Familiarity 
Ratings 
Liberal Ratings Conservative 
Ratings 
Racism Ratings Identified 
Correctly 
Creativity 
Movement 
Hate 1.63 (1.29) 
N=67 
4.80 (1.62) 
N=54 
2.87 (1.45) 
N=54 
1.98 (1.39) 
N=54 
No 
Hammerskins Hate 1.14 (.58) 
N=65 
3.33 (1.60) 
N=48 
3.83 (1.64) 
N=48 
3.82 (1.93) 
N=49 
No 
Ku Klux Klan Hate 5.97 (1.40) 
N=66 
2.25 (2.12) 
N=65 
5.19 (2.44) 
N=64 
6.55 (1.55) 
N=66 
Yes 
National 
Alliance 
Hate 1.79 (1.41) 
N=67 
3.82 (1.42) 
N=55 
4.00 (1.47) 
N=54 
2.38 (1.46) 
N=53 
No 
National 
Socialist 
Movement 
Hate 2.27 (1.77) 
N=67 
4.76 (1.90) 
N=59 
3.05 (1.86) 
N=59 
2.70 (1.82) 
N=60 
No 
Nationalist 
Coalition 
Hate 1.46 (1.11) 
N=67 
3.56 (1.27) 
N=52 
3.62 (1.39) 
N=52 
2.75 (1.63) 
N=52 
No 
Skinheads Hate 3.80 (1.94) 
N=66 
2.55 (1.92) 
N=62 
4.87 (2.12) 
N=62 
6.28 (1.53) 
N=64 
Yes 
 Group Name Type of Group Familiarity 
Ratings 
Liberal Ratings Conservative 
Ratings 
Racism Ratings Identified 
Correctly 
Volksfront Hate 1.12 (.77) 
N=67 
3.44 (1.43) 
N=48 
3.46 (1.41) 
N=48 
2.88 (1.55) 
N=48 
No 
White Aryan 
Resistance 
(WAR) 
Hate 2.40 (2.04) 
N=67 
2.53 (1.72) 
N=58 
4.66 (1.97) 
N=58 
5.40 (2.04) 
N=60 
Yes 
White Order of 
Thule 
Hate 1.05 (.21) 
N=66 
2.92 (1.46) 
N=49 
3.96 (1.68) 
N=49 
4.30 (2.14) 
N=50 
Yes 
White 
Revolution 
Hate 1.85 (1.31) 
N=67 
2.82 (1.95) 
N=52 
5.00 (1.95) 
N=55 
5.89 (1.53) 
N=56 
Yes 
Note. Means are presented first with standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 2 
Correlation matrices for Experiment 1 variables overall and by condition 
Overall (N=85) 1. 2. 3. 4. 
 1. SDO --    
 2. Political Orientation -.38*** --   
 3. Perceptions of Immorality .29*** -.20
+
 --  
 4. Moral Outrage .48*** -.32*** .78*** -- 
KKK Condition (N=29)     
 1. SDO --    
 2. Political Orientation -.33
+
 --   
 3. Perceptions of Immorality .25
ns
 -.08
ns
 --  
 4. Moral Outrage .53** -.12
ns
 .81*** -- 
Republican Party Condition (N=28)     
 1. SDO --    
 2. Political Orientation -.36
+
 --   
 3. Perceptions of Immorality .27
ns
 -.28
ns
 --  
 4. Moral Outrage .47* -.53** .57** -- 
American Atheists Condition (N=28)     
 1. SDO --    
 2. Political Orientation -.43* --   
 3. Perceptions of Immorality .28
ns
 -.23
ns
 --  
 4. Moral Outrage .46* -.34
+
 .83*** -- 
Note. ***p<.001. **p<.01. *p<.05. 
+
p<.10. 
ns
p>.10.  
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Table 3 
Mean perceptions of racism in the mission statement of the Council for Conservative 
Citizens by condition (i.e., before-argument, after-argument, and control) and agreement 
with the arguments against affirmative action. 
 Before-
Argument 
After- 
Argument 
Control Totals (N) 
Agree 3.86
a
 4.31
b
 4.00
ab
 81 
Disagree 4.18
b
 3.89
a
 4.06
ab
 69 
Totals (N) 47 51 52 150 
Note. Means with different letters are significantly different each other (p<.05).  
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Figure 1 
Ratings of immorality, controlling for support for group based equality by the source of 
the argument against immigration 
 Note. Range is 1 (moral) to 7 (immoral).   
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Figure 2 
Moral outrage, controlling for support for group based equality by the source of the 
argument against immigration 
 
Note. Range is 1 (low moral outrage) to 7.33 (high moral outrage). 
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Figure 3 
Perceptions of racism in the mission statement by condition (outrage, contamination, and 
control) and agreement with the argument 
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Appendix A 
 
Arguments against immigration to the U.S. used in Experiment 1 
 
It‟s about time the U.S. cracked down on illegal immigration. With our country in 
economic turmoil and the continued threat of terrorism, we can‟t afford to take any risks 
with the homeland. Illegals probably brought the Swine Flu to the U.S., which has 
already killed thousands of people and costs millions of dollars in productivity. With our 
unemployment rate at 10%, we need to preserve jobs for Americans. Immigrants are 
costing our country money we can‟t afford right now, with their dependency on welfare, 
wanting free educations and medical care, and high costs of bilingual education. 
Immigrants often come from backward countries that don‟t understand our traditions of 
religion and freedom, and there is a real danger of watering down our culture because of 
too much immigration. It would be nice if the U.S. could be all things to all people, but 
right now, its time to keep America for the Americans. 
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Appendix B 
Arguments against affirmative action used in Experiment 2 
 The federal government has enacted programs and laws designed for the 
exclusive discrimination against those of White European ancestry. Promotions, hiring 
and scholarships should be based on ability and not upon a person's race.  Affirmative 
action is a growing source of economical inequality for Caucasians especially 
considering that in the current United States economic recession such a policy 
disenfranchises a growing number of unemployed Caucasians who have to wait last in 
line for any sense of being employed because of non-Caucasians who get jobs before 
them. 
 
 Appendix C 
Means and standard deviations from ratings of the parts of the mission statement from the Council for Conservative Citizens. Parts 2, 
6, and 12 of the Mission Statement were selected to be used in Experiment 2. 
Text from Mission Statement Liberal 
Ratings 
Conservative 
Ratings 
Racist 
Ratings 
2. We believe the United States is a European country and that Americans are part of the 
European people. We believe that the United States derives from and is an integral part of 
European civilization and the European people and that the American people and government 
should remain European in their composition and character. We therefore oppose the massive 
immigration of non-European and non-Western peoples into the United States that threatens to 
transform our nation into a non-European majority in our lifetime. We believe that illegal 
immigration must be stopped, if necessary by military force and placing troops on our national 
borders; that illegal aliens must be returned to their own countries; and that legal immigration 
must be severely restricted or halted through appropriate changes in our laws and policies. We 
also oppose all efforts to mix the races of mankind, to promote non-white races over the 
European-American people through so-called “affirmative action” and similar measures, to 
destroy or denigrate the European-American heritage, including the heritage of the Southern 
people, and to force the integration of the races. 
2.63 
(1.78) 
N=67 
4.96 (1.93) 
N=67 
5.10 
(1.99) 
N=67 
6. The traditional family is the basic unit of human society. We believe in the traditional 
family as the basic unit of human society and morality, and we oppose all efforts by the state and 
other powers to weaken the structure of the American family through toleration of sexual 
licentiousness, homosexuality and other perversions, mixture of the races, pornography in all 
forms, and subversion of the authority of parents. 
2.52 
(1.84) 
N=67 
5.40 (1.93) 
N=67 
3.85 
(2.21) 
N=66 
    
    
    
    
    
 Text from Mission Statement Liberal 
Ratings 
Conservative 
Ratings 
Racist 
Ratings 
12. Traditional Education under Local Control. We believe that education is primarily the 
concern of parents and families and local communities and therefore we oppose federal aid to 
education and federal efforts to control or direct education. We believe that education should 
inform and build the mind and character, not brainwash children with political propaganda or 
“liberate” them from the traditional values and loyalties their families have taught them. We 
therefore oppose all “sex education” as well as so-called “multiculturalist” and “Afrocentric” 
curricula, “Outcome-Based Education,” and similar radical indoctrination in the schools. We 
oppose all efforts to inflate grades, adulterate or “dumb down” tests and examinations, and 
introduce irrelevant and wasteful courses for the purpose of advancing some backward students 
over others more talented or more productive. We believe the schools, public, private, and 
parochial, should teach students to be proud of being Americans and proud of their national and 
local identities, and that they should instill in them the values of Western, Christian, and 
American civilization. We support the authority of teachers and school administrators to 
discipline students, including the authority to expel them from school if students will not abide 
by the rules and laws of the community. We support the right of parents to send their children to 
private schools or to educate their children at home if they so desire, without government 
intrusion or control. We support the right of private schools to select their own students, faculty, 
curricula, standards, and methods of administration. 
2.67 
(1.94) 
N=67 
5.57 (1.66) 
N=67 
3.03 
(1.95) 
N=66 
1. We believe the United States is a Christian country. We believe that the United States of 
America is a Christian country, that its people are a Christian people, and that its government 
and public leaders at all levels must reflect Christian beliefs and values. We therefore oppose all 
efforts to deny or weaken the Christian heritage of the United States, including the 
unconstitutional prohibitions of prayers and other religious expression in schools and other 
public institutions. 
2.30 
(1.78) 
N=67 
5.49 (1.88) 
N=67 
3.15 
(2.18) 
N=67 
    
    
    
    
    
 Text from Mission Statement Liberal 
Ratings 
Conservative 
Ratings 
Racist 
Ratings 
3. The United States is a sovereign and independent nation. We believe the United States is a 
sovereign and independent nation, that our independence as a nation is the most precious legacy 
of our Founding Fathers, and that all treaties, agreements, conventions, international 
organizations, and institutions must recognize and respect our national sovereignty and 
independence. We therefore oppose the so-called “New World Order” and its attempts to abolish 
national sovereignty and independence and to construct a one-world state in which America 
would vanish and Americans would be enslaved. We call for the U.S. government to withdraw 
from membership in the United Nations, the World Court, the International Monetary Fund, 
NAFTA, and the World Trade Organization. We oppose any attempt to place American military 
personnel under foreign command. We oppose any effort to place Americans, military or 
civilian, on trial before, or subject them to legal punishments by, international courts or 
organizations. We oppose, and we support official U.S. renunciation of, any treaty, agreement, 
or convention that seeks to dictate law to the United States or any state, that violates national 
sovereignty, or denies or violates the constitutional rights of Americans. 
4.03 
(1.90) 
N=67 
4.32 (1.88) 
N=66 
2.38 
(1.65) 
N=66 
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4. The United States is a constitutional republic. We believe the United States is a 
constitutional republic, governed by law and by the original intent of the United States 
Constitution and of the men who framed it. We believe the Constitution can be changed only by 
the proper procedure of amendment or constitutional convention and not by court decision, 
popular majority, political whim, or legislative fiat. We therefore oppose the “imperial judiciary” 
in the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal courts that has usurped more and more power to itself 
in the last century and has imposed on our country the most odious and harmful rulings. We 
reject the legitimacy and constitutionality of the rulings handed down by the imperial judiciary; 
we support the appointment of judges and justices who are qualified to interpret the Constitution 
and the laws and are committed to their proper interpretation; and we support the impeachment 
of judges and justices who usurp or claim powers not granted them by the Constitution. We also 
oppose the “imperial bureaucracy” that imposes unconstitutional administrative decrees in such 
fields as business, agriculture, labor, and education that tyrannically interfere with personal 
liberty and dignity, private property, the sanctity of the family, and ethical conduct. We support 
the abolition of those government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels that have no 
constitutional foundation, including the U.S. Departments of Education, Housing and Urban 
Development, Energy, Health and Human Services, and similar agencies. We support the 
separation of powers that is a fundamental principle of the U.S. Constitution and of basic human 
liberty. We support the restoration of the constitutionally proper balance among the three 
branches of the federal government and the reduction of their powers, size, personnel, and costs 
to the limits intended by the Constitution. 
3.52 
(1.78) 
N=67 
5.24 (1.44) 
N=67 
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5. We believe in States’ Rights, the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, and the Bill of Rights. 
We believe in states‟ rights, as guaranteed by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the 
Constitution; in the individual right to keep and bear arms, as guaranteed by the Second 
Amendment to the Constitution; and in all the rights and liberties guaranteed by the body of the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. We therefore oppose all efforts by the federal government to 
dictate to the states and local governments and communities, and we oppose federal efforts to 
engineer or impose behavior and beliefs on citizens and communities. We oppose “gun control” 
in all forms and demand that all such legislation and policies be repealed. We also oppose all 
such legislation as so-called “hate crime” or “bias crime” laws. Such laws merely penalize 
thought and expression rather than genuinely criminal action and are a dangerous and frightening 
step toward government Thought Control. Similarly, we oppose all so-called “politically correct” 
speech codes and “sensitivity training” in schools, colleges, universities, and businesses that 
punish free expression, restrict thought and study, intimidate dissent, and generally demean and 
diminish human communications and community. We also oppose, as stated, all efforts to deny 
Americans their rights of religious expression and worship as guaranteed in the First 
Amendment, as well as efforts to deny rights of assembly and association. 
3.52 
(2.03) 
N=65 
5.13 (1.68) 
N=67 
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7. Private property and free enterprise are the foundations of our economy. We believe in 
private property and free enterprise as the foundations of our economic life and the basis of 
American wealth. We oppose efforts by the state to regulate, plan, manage, control, or 
nationalize private property in any form. We oppose the ruinous taxation that government has 
imposed on working Americans and we call for real tax reform that will allow working men and 
women to retain what they have earned. We support the repeal of the estate tax. We affirm that 
the best economic decision-maker is the individual acting in what he believes is his own best 
interest. We believe that tax policies and other economic legislation and policies should reflect the 
importance of small businessmen, the family farm, and other independent, locally and privately 
owned and operated enterprises. While we accept the need for some public welfare, health care, 
unemployment, and old age assistance, we believe in such programs only as a last resort for 
those who truly need them. We believe tax laws should encourage private charity rather than 
public support for the poor, the disabled, and the sick and elderly who are unable to care for 
themselves. We support welfare programs that seek to return recipients of welfare to productive 
work as soon as possible. We oppose all welfare for immigrants, whether legal or illegal. 
3.48 
(2.00) 
N=67 
4.93 (1.90) 
N=67 
2.88 
(1.81) 
N=67 
8. Cultural, national, and racial integrity. We support the cultural and national heritage of the 
United States and the race and civilization of which it is a part, as well as the expression and 
celebration of the legitimate subcultures and ethnic and regional identities of our people. We 
oppose all efforts to discredit, “debunk,” denigrate, ridicule, subvert, or express disrespect for 
that heritage. We believe public monuments and symbols should reflect the real heritage of our 
people, and not a politically convenient, inaccurate, insulting, or fictitious heritage. 
4.43 
(1.92) 
N=67 
3.82 (1.84) 
N=67 
1.90 
(1.40) 
N=67 
9. A Strong National Defense. We believe in the strongest possible defense for the United 
States. We oppose the presence of homosexuals and women in the military services and 
especially of women in combat roles. 
2.18 
(1.81) 
N=66 
6.23 (1.41) 
N=66 
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10. America First Foreign Policy. We believe that in the aftermath of the U.S. victory over 
Soviet Communism, the United States has little need to retain the political and military 
commitments to allies made during the Cold War. While we wish these allies well, we believe 
we cannot continue to support their defense budgets, guarantee their security, fight their wars, or 
finance their governments and economies through foreign aid. We therefore call for a 
comprehensive review of all U.S. diplomatic commitments and U.S. withdrawal from those 
alliances and commitments that no longer serve our national interests or that threaten to entangle 
us in unnecessary foreign wars, conflicts, and quarrels. We therefore oppose continued 
membership in NATO and similar outdated Cold War alliances; we oppose sending American 
troops on U.N. peace-keeping missions or into similar unconstitutionally undeclared wars under 
the names of “police actions.” We oppose sending American military personnel into wars and 
conflicts that do not concern our national security and interests. We oppose ever sending 
American military men into combat without the intention to achieve victory. We oppose using 
American prisoners of war as diplomatic “bargaining chips” under any circumstances, and we 
oppose abandoning American POWs to merciless enemies after the cessation of conflict to suit 
the political interests of office-holders. We oppose all foreign aid and call for its termination. We 
support the investigation of lobbying groups that represent the interests of foreign states or 
foreign powers and the enactment of legislation that will outlaw lobbying Congress or the 
executive branch on behalf of foreign states. 
4.22 
(1.80) 
N=67 
4.07 (1.90) 
N=67 
2.53 
(1.70) 
N=66 
11. America First Trade Policy. We believe that just as our nation has legitimate international 
political and military interests, so it also has a legitimate international economic interest. We 
believe our trade policy should reflect our national economic interest and that the protection of 
our economy, including the jobs of our workers, our farms, and our manufacturing industries, is 
a vitally necessary duty of our national government. 
4.06 
(1.80) 
N=66 
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13. Strong and Just Law Enforcement. We believe in the moral and legal responsibility of the 
individual and therefore that good behavior should be rewarded and bad behavior should be 
punished. We believe the most effective and most just response to crime is swift, certain, and 
morally appropriate punishment. We believe in capital punishment for the crimes of murder, 
rape, treason, and espionage. We oppose the substitution of the pseudo-sciences of psychiatry, 
sociology, and “rehabilitation” for real justice. We believe law enforcement should be mainly a 
function of local and state government, and we therefore oppose all efforts to establish a national 
police force or to nationalize law enforcement; we oppose similar efforts to create a global or 
international police force and to “globalize” law enforcement. We oppose the extradition of law-
abiding American citizens to trials before foreign courts under laws to which they have never 
assented. We oppose all international criminal tribunals and all efforts to diminish national 
sovereignty through the internationalization of criminal law. While we support and deeply 
respect all law enforcement officers, we also insist that law enforcement at all levels operate 
within the law, that law enforcement respect the rights of all citizens, and that spying on and 
harassment of loyal and law-abiding citizens by law enforcement agencies, by the military 
services, or by intelligence services at any level of government should be strictly forbidden and 
severely punished. 
3.40 
(1.92) 
N=67 
5.13 (1.77) 
N=67 
1.89 
(1.49) 
N=66 
14. Protection of the Environment and Natural Heritage. We believe that the natural 
environment and resources of a nation are among its most precious, valuable, and irreplaceable 
treasures. We believe in the protection of the environment from reckless greed as well as from 
irresponsible government. We support the protection of truly endangered species of wildlife and 
areas of natural beauty. 
5.24 
(1.64) 
N=67 
3.52 (1.84) 
N=67 
1.42 
(1.16) 
N=67 
 
Note. Means are presented first with standard deviations in parentheses.
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Appendix C 
Adapted items from the symbolic racism 2000 scale (Henry & Sears, 2002) to measure 
how racist participants thought the organization was. 
Instructions. What is you impression of this organization? How does this organization 
think? Please fill out the questions below as a member of the organization—NOT YOUR 
OWN VIEWS. Now, we would like to know your opinions of the group whose mission 
statement you just read. 
 
Some say that black leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they 
haven‟t pushed fast enough. What does this organization think about this? (Reverse 
Coded) 
  
 Trying to push very much too fast Moving at about the right  Going too 
      speed    Slowly 
 
How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today does this 
organization think blacks are responsible for creating? (Reverse Coded) 
 
 All of it Most  Some  Not much at all 
 
How much discrimination against blacks does this organization feel there is in the United 
States today, limiting their chances to get ahead? 
 
  A lot  Some  Just a little None at all 
 
This organization believes that generations of slavery and discrimination have created 
conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower 
class. (Reverse Coded) 
 
Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Strongly Agree 
 
This organization believes that over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they 
deserve. (Reverse Coded) 
 
Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Strongly Agree 
 
This organization believes that over the past few years, blacks have gotten more 
economically than they deserve. 
 
Strongly Disagree  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 Strongly Agree 
 
